WL 31114069, at *2 ("If the MDL Motion is granted, all of the Court's time, energy, and acquired knowledge regarding this action and its pretrial procedures will be wasted."). With respect to the impact of this Court's actions on the transferee court, any efforts by this Court at case management will very likely have to be repeated by the judge to whom the multidistrict litigation is assigned. Not surprisingly, courts have often recognized that these concerns of judicial economy weigh in favor of a stay when a motion for transfer is pending before the JPML. *See Jackson*, 2006 WL 448695, at *1; *Bledsoe*, 2006 WL 335450, at *1; *The Gator Corp.*, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 428; *Arthur-Magna, Inc.*, 1991 WL 13725, at *1.

II. *Alternatively, the Court Should Grant Toyota An Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint, Particularly In Light of Plaintiffs' Expressed Intent to Amend.*

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs have a section entitled "Proposed Cause of Action" stating their intent to attempt to "add violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act." Pl. Compl., ¶ 50. Plaintiffs allege "[c]ommensurate with the filing of this Complaint, Plaintiffs will be sending Defendants a 60 day notice letter as required under the act and will request leave to add their cause of action for Plaintiffs, individually and as representatives of the Texas Class." *Id.* Plaintiffs served a purported notice letter dated January 29, 2010. *See* Ex. D. While Plaintiffs expressly state that they intend to file an amended Complaint that will supersede their original Complaint, without any legitimate justification, Plaintiffs have refused to consent to any extension of time for Toyota to file its response to Plaintiffs' Complaint. If this case is still pending in this Court by the time Plaintiffs amend and Toyota's response to the amended complaint is due, Toyota will have to file a response to Plaintiffs' amended complaint, making its original response a nullity and entire waste of time and resources. Given Plaintiffs' expressed